Today, we think it would be important to leave the analysis of the latest news aside (including the negotiations on Greece’s debt) and instead, to present a theoretical framework that may allow us to understand the ongoing rally and what may develop during 2012 and beyond. There is nothing more practical than a good theory and a good theory is indeed what we are looking for this morning.

Let’s first examine what we are witnessing today, namely the financing by the Fed and the European Central Bank (“ECB”), of the Eurozone financial system. Below, we describe how it works and we carry the analysis to the extreme. We like challenging models to their extreme implications, because this aprioristic deductive exercise forces us to identify what mainstream economists, many months later than us, usually end up calling “tail risks”.

In step 1 above, we see the first pillar of the EU financial system bailout: The Fed extending US dollar swaps to the ECB, at below market rates. As can be seen, these swaps are an asset of the Fed and a liability to the ECB, which receives US dollars in exchange. With these US dollars, as we explained on December 12th, the Fed avoids a liquidation of US denominated assets by EU banks and the resulting increase in the cost of US dollar funding as well as in counterparty risk, for US financial institutions. These swaps can therefore be seen as vendor financing in favor of US banks, at the expense of American taxpayers and anyone who invests their savings in US dollars (i.e. US banks, via the Fed, provide cheap financing to their trading counterparties, all paid for by a devaluation in the purchasing power of the US dollar. On this matter, please refer our comments on September 12^th, 2011).

However, the extension of USD swaps is not enough to save the status quo. The institutional weakness of the Euro zone, having failed (back in March 2011) the move towards a unified bond and fiscal integration, triggered the jurisdictional arbitrage of deposits (Euro funding). Deposits were taken from banks in the periphery (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy) and shifted to the core (Germany, France, Netherlands). This situation generated a funding squeeze that was and continues to be addressed by long-term refinancing operations (“LTROs”) by the ECB, as shown on step 2. In these operations, the ECB extends collateralized Euros to EU banks. These are loans, assets to the ECB, and liabilities to the EU banks. Since its inception, the ECB has steadily been decreasing the minimum quality of acceptable collateral and increasing the tenor of the financing. Most of these funds have been returning to the ECB as excess reserves, a disturbing fact. But at one point, the repression by the political apparatus and the temptation to use these cheap funds to buy high yielding EU sovereign debt is too strong and we start seeing the use of these funds to monetize (i.e. purchase sovereign bonds in the primary market) EU fiscal deficits. That is shown, as step 3.

On step 3 too, we see that these funds keep open the window for depositors in weak banks to continue the liquidation of their deposits, in exchange of fresh cash. On the other hand, once the governments sell their bonds to the banks, they distribute the Euros issued by the ECB across the Eurozone.

Finally, on step 4, we see the conversion of these Euros by EU depositors and corporations, into US dollars (or Swiss Francs or gold), as a way to protect their savings from the unsustainable status quo: They know that the EU fiscal deficits will remain alive and have uncertainty on the future of the monetary system. Who provides them with the window of opportunity to exchange their Euros for US dollars? Ultimately, the Fed, with the provision of cheap US dollars to the ECB, via swaps.

This circular process, in extremis, brings us to the final line in the graph above, where we show the balance sheets of the Fed, the ECB, the EU banks and the EU depositors & Non-financials. The Fed will own US swaps against which US dollars will have been printed. Yes, printed! This had occurred in the 1920’s and 1930’s, but at least back then, those US dollars were somehow backed by gold reserves. Today, that’s no longer the case. Who will have the US dollars owed to the Fed? Not the EU banks nor the ECB, but the EU depositors & Non-financials! In summary, the people of the Eurozone!

In extremis too, the balance sheet of the ECB will look like that of a middle man. As assets, it will carry long-term refinancings. As liabilities, it will have the US swaps, that it extended to the EU banks. These EU banks however used the euros to buy sovereign debt, which is now their asset, and owe euros (i.e. LTROs) to the ECB. This is a very unstable situation, because if the fiscal situation of the Euro zone does not improve, these sovereign bonds in possession by the EU banks will remain driving capital losses.

This analytical framework leaves us with questions:

If the Fed ends up being the creditor of the EU depositors and corporations…how will it ever get its money back? What will be needed to repatriate these US dollars? We think there are only two ways to solve this problem. The best case and least likely is to see an improvement in the fiscal situation of the Euro zone. If deficits were stabilized or even reduced, the sovereign bonds held by the EU banks would drive capital gains, euros would flow back again to the EU banks in the periphery and US dollars would have to be sold in exchange, to buy these Euros. The EU banks would be then in a position to both return the LTROs and the US dollars to the ECB. The worst case occurs if the Fed implements an exit strategy, raising US dollar interest rates and US dollars flow back to the US. This is also not likely, at least in the short-to-near term, in our view. This would require, a priori, a strong economic recovery.

Another interesting question is related to the Euros in circulation, supplied by the LTROs: What happened to them? In extremis, we see that the EU depositors and Non-financials first took these Euros from the EU banks and later exchanged them for US dollars. Were they taken out of circulation? No, but the velocity of circulation increased, from the ECB to the banks, to the people, and back to the ECB. This is consistent with the monetization of sovereign debt and a context of high inflation. Once again, we note that this analysis is in extremis…For now, we can see it as a natural logical consequence. To mainstream analysts, this is a “tail risk”. The reader is of course free to take a view on this matter.

Please, note that this analysis implies the survival of the Eurozone with the liquidation of sovereign debts via inflation.

Is this status quo sustainable? If not, what will accelerate its demise? How will gold and the rest of the risky asset spectrum behave? Below, we present a flow chart, where we seek to summarize this process.

As we can see, as backdrop to the process described above, the Euro zone today is crowding out private investments, given the high cost of sovereign debt. In addition, it has and continues to implement higher tax rates and further interventionism and financial repression. With the Fed swaps, as we pointed out on September 12th, the Euro is still artificially stronger than without the swaps, which makes the EU less competitive. Finally, the institutional uncertainty of the EU zone remains unadressed. All these factors only contribute to prolong the recession and a high unemployment rate.

The flow chart is clear: As long as the people of the EU put up with this situation and the EU Council, chaired by Mr. Herman Van Rompuy effectively kills democracy at the national level AND as long as the Fed continues to extend US dollar swaps, this status quo will remain. If people revolt and the EU breaks up or if the Fed is no longer politically strong enough to force these swaps, the status quo will collapse.

Contrary to popular belief, this status quo is based on the “coupling” and not “decoupling” of the Fed with the ECB. This coupling relaxes correlations, because the US dollars sent by the Fed to the ECB were printed and nobody in the US feels the immediate pain. Hence, we have the rally in stocks and gold, without any correction in the US Treasuries market.

Whenever the political sustainability of the EU is challenged, we will see a run for liquidity. And 2012 will have many of these panic situations, affecting any late longs in gold or stocks.

Finally, when the “decoupling” takes place, the US dollar can only remain strong if the fiscal situation of the US permits. But we fear that the Fed will embark on interest rate targeting. This is a story for another letter…

The trend is for asset inflation, and will last as long as the people of the EU and the US do not challenge the political status quo.

Martin Sibileau

This is our first letter of 2012. The year started with a mini rally that every analyst out there attributes to something called “decoupling”. Why? Because the strength in asset inflation, although global in nature, is particularly more solid in the US.

The oddity appears to be higher asset prices, in spite of a weaker Euro, in a Eurozone whose main problems remain unsolved. Correlations are breaking! say analysts, at every opportunity they have to speak to the media.

We want to start the year tackling this issue, which we feel is very important to understand. Without mincing words, we will say that the concept of “decoupling” is completely wrong and if followed, it will lead to wrong conclusions and horrible investment decisions.

The fall in asset prices during the last quarter of 2011 was triggered by a run for liquidity, typical of fiat currency systems or systems with leverage. Euro zone banks had to sell USD denominated assets to raise liquidity, lifting the price of the USD and putting pressure on the rest of the risk asset spectrum. This was addressed in November, when the Fed confirmed its commitment to continue extending USD swaps to other central banks, at a reduced price of 50bps. At “A View from the Trenches”, not only have we dealt extensively with the mechanics and implications of currency swaps but also, we believe we would not be mistaken if we said that we were the first and only ones to point to its relevance, way before anyone else in the market. For instance, in February 2010 (almost two years ago!), we warned:

“…that France did the same (in the 1920s) that we suspect the US would do in case the Euro plunged: Providing Europe with USD currency swaps is the same as having France in the late 1920’s not withdrawing their gold deposits from London. Think about it. I know it sounds counter intuitive at first sight, but ask yourselves what was backing the sterling pound then, and what would the Euro be exchanged for if it plunged? If the USDs are there for the Euro as gold was for the pound, we will be only delaying a painful adjustment…” (refer: www.sibileau.com/martin/2010/02/26 )

How relevant was this action taken in November? The chart below (source: Bloomberg) shows us how the price of the 3-month EURUSD swap reverted after November 30^th:

How consequential was the amount of swaps extended by the Fed? The next chart (source: Bloomberg)gives some perspective, showing what the Fed extended in 2008, vs. what occurred last November:

The spike is certainly visible. Back in 2008, the deleveraging was just starting, so it would seem unlikely to us to see those levels again. However, we must not underestimate the magnitudes seen in November and the sovereign problem ahead, particularly if it threatens to break the Euro zone. In light of all this, it is clear to us (and not to the rest, apparently) that rather than a decoupling, we are seeing a huge coupling. In fact, we are witnessing the mother of all couplings! As we explained on December 12^th, the Fed is bailing out the European Central Bank, because without US dollars, the run for liquidity in Europe would result in a general run against the ECB. But since December, the ECB is now also financing on a 3-yr basis, the liquidity, in Euros, of the Eurozone banks. There is plenty of speculation as to what the Euro zone banks do with that money but we think it is safe to say that at least, they are not forced to liquidate assets. On the accounting analysis of the 3-yr financing, we found a very interesting article, by Izabella Kaminska, at FT Alphaville, named “The curious case of ECB deposits”.

In summary, the mother of all couplings consists in linking the balance sheet of Euro zone banks indirectly with the Fed: The Euro zone banks get cheap liquidity from the ECB in Euros, supported by the US dollars provided by the Fed to the ECB. Asset are not sold now and in fact, they could actually be purchased later, if the sovereign crisis in Europe was to be addressed.

What does this all mean? Well, as we explained on December 12^th, this printing of billions of US dollars by the Fed to back the ECB means that Americans need not to save any extra, to bail out Europe. This is what puzzles mainstream economists, who refer to this “oddity” as a “break in correlations”. The big mistake is to call this a decoupling, because it is precisely the opposite: The problems of the Euro zone are now really coupled to the Fed’s balance sheet! A decoupling would consist actually in letting the Euro zone banks collapse, together with the ECB, without any swaps. Such a sell off would bring down the price of every single asset vs. the US dollar.

Now that we have clarified this point, we must ask ourselves how this should impact gold. On this point, we must say we are now in uncharted waters. Yes, the swaps are nothing new, but the context in which they unfold is. With this in mind, we think that the rhythm in 2012 will be marked the evolution of the fiscal situation in the Euro zone. On Friday, we saw a massive downgrade in sovereign risk by S&P that was fairly priced in by the market. Going forward, further deterioration or default surprises will accelerate the pressure on Euro banks, which in turn will force the Fed to become more coupled and to print more US dollars. We think that in this context the volatility and the bull trend in gold should both increase.

Why would we not also want to buy stocks? Because we follow the view of Friedrich Von Hayek: We believe that this process is also affecting relative prices everywhere and when relative prices are distorted, in the long term, production falls and we end with a higher amount of money in circulation, available to purchase a smaller amount of goods. Inflation, in the long term, always bankrupts producers and benefits the holder of products. If you don’t believe us, ask gold miners how they feel about the performance of their stocks vs. that of gold bullion.

Martin Sibileau