Today, we think it would be important to leave the analysis of the latest news aside (including the negotiations on Greece’s debt) and instead, to present a theoretical framework that may allow us to understand the ongoing rally and what may develop during 2012 and beyond. There is nothing more practical than a good theory and a good theory is indeed what we are looking for this morning.

Let’s first examine what we are witnessing today, namely the financing by the Fed and the European Central Bank (“ECB”), of the Eurozone financial system. Below, we describe how it works and we carry the analysis to the extreme. We like challenging models to their extreme implications, because this aprioristic deductive exercise forces us to identify what mainstream economists, many months later than us, usually end up calling “tail risks”.

In step 1 above, we see the first pillar of the EU financial system bailout: The Fed extending US dollar swaps to the ECB, at below market rates. As can be seen, these swaps are an asset of the Fed and a liability to the ECB, which receives US dollars in exchange. With these US dollars, as we explained on December 12th, the Fed avoids a liquidation of US denominated assets by EU banks and the resulting increase in the cost of US dollar funding as well as in counterparty risk, for US financial institutions. These swaps can therefore be seen as vendor financing in favor of US banks, at the expense of American taxpayers and anyone who invests their savings in US dollars (i.e. US banks, via the Fed, provide cheap financing to their trading counterparties, all paid for by a devaluation in the purchasing power of the US dollar. On this matter, please refer our comments on September 12^th, 2011).

However, the extension of USD swaps is not enough to save the status quo. The institutional weakness of the Euro zone, having failed (back in March 2011) the move towards a unified bond and fiscal integration, triggered the jurisdictional arbitrage of deposits (Euro funding). Deposits were taken from banks in the periphery (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy) and shifted to the core (Germany, France, Netherlands). This situation generated a funding squeeze that was and continues to be addressed by long-term refinancing operations (“LTROs”) by the ECB, as shown on step 2. In these operations, the ECB extends collateralized Euros to EU banks. These are loans, assets to the ECB, and liabilities to the EU banks. Since its inception, the ECB has steadily been decreasing the minimum quality of acceptable collateral and increasing the tenor of the financing. Most of these funds have been returning to the ECB as excess reserves, a disturbing fact. But at one point, the repression by the political apparatus and the temptation to use these cheap funds to buy high yielding EU sovereign debt is too strong and we start seeing the use of these funds to monetize (i.e. purchase sovereign bonds in the primary market) EU fiscal deficits. That is shown, as step 3.

On step 3 too, we see that these funds keep open the window for depositors in weak banks to continue the liquidation of their deposits, in exchange of fresh cash. On the other hand, once the governments sell their bonds to the banks, they distribute the Euros issued by the ECB across the Eurozone.

Finally, on step 4, we see the conversion of these Euros by EU depositors and corporations, into US dollars (or Swiss Francs or gold), as a way to protect their savings from the unsustainable status quo: They know that the EU fiscal deficits will remain alive and have uncertainty on the future of the monetary system. Who provides them with the window of opportunity to exchange their Euros for US dollars? Ultimately, the Fed, with the provision of cheap US dollars to the ECB, via swaps.

This circular process, in extremis, brings us to the final line in the graph above, where we show the balance sheets of the Fed, the ECB, the EU banks and the EU depositors & Non-financials. The Fed will own US swaps against which US dollars will have been printed. Yes, printed! This had occurred in the 1920’s and 1930’s, but at least back then, those US dollars were somehow backed by gold reserves. Today, that’s no longer the case. Who will have the US dollars owed to the Fed? Not the EU banks nor the ECB, but the EU depositors & Non-financials! In summary, the people of the Eurozone!

In extremis too, the balance sheet of the ECB will look like that of a middle man. As assets, it will carry long-term refinancings. As liabilities, it will have the US swaps, that it extended to the EU banks. These EU banks however used the euros to buy sovereign debt, which is now their asset, and owe euros (i.e. LTROs) to the ECB. This is a very unstable situation, because if the fiscal situation of the Euro zone does not improve, these sovereign bonds in possession by the EU banks will remain driving capital losses.

This analytical framework leaves us with questions:

If the Fed ends up being the creditor of the EU depositors and corporations…how will it ever get its money back? What will be needed to repatriate these US dollars? We think there are only two ways to solve this problem. The best case and least likely is to see an improvement in the fiscal situation of the Euro zone. If deficits were stabilized or even reduced, the sovereign bonds held by the EU banks would drive capital gains, euros would flow back again to the EU banks in the periphery and US dollars would have to be sold in exchange, to buy these Euros. The EU banks would be then in a position to both return the LTROs and the US dollars to the ECB. The worst case occurs if the Fed implements an exit strategy, raising US dollar interest rates and US dollars flow back to the US. This is also not likely, at least in the short-to-near term, in our view. This would require, a priori, a strong economic recovery.

Another interesting question is related to the Euros in circulation, supplied by the LTROs: What happened to them? In extremis, we see that the EU depositors and Non-financials first took these Euros from the EU banks and later exchanged them for US dollars. Were they taken out of circulation? No, but the velocity of circulation increased, from the ECB to the banks, to the people, and back to the ECB. This is consistent with the monetization of sovereign debt and a context of high inflation. Once again, we note that this analysis is in extremis…For now, we can see it as a natural logical consequence. To mainstream analysts, this is a “tail risk”. The reader is of course free to take a view on this matter.

Please, note that this analysis implies the survival of the Eurozone with the liquidation of sovereign debts via inflation.

Is this status quo sustainable? If not, what will accelerate its demise? How will gold and the rest of the risky asset spectrum behave? Below, we present a flow chart, where we seek to summarize this process.

As we can see, as backdrop to the process described above, the Euro zone today is crowding out private investments, given the high cost of sovereign debt. In addition, it has and continues to implement higher tax rates and further interventionism and financial repression. With the Fed swaps, as we pointed out on September 12th, the Euro is still artificially stronger than without the swaps, which makes the EU less competitive. Finally, the institutional uncertainty of the EU zone remains unadressed. All these factors only contribute to prolong the recession and a high unemployment rate.

The flow chart is clear: As long as the people of the EU put up with this situation and the EU Council, chaired by Mr. Herman Van Rompuy effectively kills democracy at the national level AND as long as the Fed continues to extend US dollar swaps, this status quo will remain. If people revolt and the EU breaks up or if the Fed is no longer politically strong enough to force these swaps, the status quo will collapse.

Contrary to popular belief, this status quo is based on the “coupling” and not “decoupling” of the Fed with the ECB. This coupling relaxes correlations, because the US dollars sent by the Fed to the ECB were printed and nobody in the US feels the immediate pain. Hence, we have the rally in stocks and gold, without any correction in the US Treasuries market.

Whenever the political sustainability of the EU is challenged, we will see a run for liquidity. And 2012 will have many of these panic situations, affecting any late longs in gold or stocks.

Finally, when the “decoupling” takes place, the US dollar can only remain strong if the fiscal situation of the US permits. But we fear that the Fed will embark on interest rate targeting. This is a story for another letter…

The trend is for asset inflation, and will last as long as the people of the EU and the US do not challenge the political status quo.

Martin Sibileau

Click here to read this article in pdf format: december-12-2011

By now, we assume our readers are acquainted with the tragicomic nature of the political events last week. Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank (ECB), during the press conference on Thursday, said that he had been misinterpreted: The ECB was not going to monetize EU sovereign debt. And if he ever was to, it was going to be only after a consistent fiscal pact was agreed upon by the Euro-zone members. Of course, he raised the bar to impossible heights. With that, gold dropped like a stone, markets sold off and 24 hours later, the EU summit ended up with the United Kingdom taking the first steps to abandon the European Union. The rest of the members, agreed that they will agree to very strict fiscal rules, approved or disapproved by a European bureaucracy, which nobody voted for nor has the ability to remove from power. In other words, democracy in the European Union, as we know it, formally died last Friday.

How will the markets react to this? We don’t know and the action in what remains of this year is not a good indicator. We suspect (and hope) that time has been bought till the bond auctions of 2012 take place, in January.

But this is not what we want to discuss today. Today, we want to graphically show the macroeconomic impact of the US dollar swaps extended by the Fed. They are indeed a form of quantitative easing. The action taken two weeks ago to bring from OIS+100bps to OIS+50bps (OIS = overnight index swap) the rate charged on US dollar liquidity lines resulted in over $52BN taken by Eurozone banks from the ECB, last week. This, friends, is Quantitative Easing 3. And below, we explain why.

Let’s first begin by looking at what occurs if there is no intervention from the Fed:

As the figure above shows, we see that in step 1, given the default risk of sovereign debt held by Eurozone banks, capital leaves the Eurozone, appreciating the US dollar. Because these banks have liabilities in US dollars and take deposits in Euros, this mismatch and the devaluation of the Euro deteriorates the risk profile of the Eurozone banks.

Eurozone banks are forced to sell US dollar loans, shown on step 2. As they sell them below par, these banks have to book losses. The non-Eurozone banks that purchase these loans cannot book immediate gains. After all, we live in a fiat currency world, and banks simply let their loans amortize. There’s no mark to market! With these purchases, capital re-enters the Eurozone, depreciating the US dollar. In the end, there is no credit crunch. Borrowers don’t suffer, because ownership of the loans is only transferred. This is neutral to sovereign risk. Going forward, if the sovereigns don’t improve their risk profile, lending capacity will be constrained.

In the end, an adjustment took place: In the FX market, in the value of the bank capital of Eurozone banks and in the amount of capital being transferred from outside the Eurozone to the Eurozone.

Now, let’s look at what occurs when the Fed extends US dollar liquidity lines. As you will see, the adjustment is delayed.

In the figure 2 above, we can see that when the Fed intervenes, it indirectly lends to Eurozone banks, through the ECB. Capital does not leave the US. Dollars are printed instead and the US dollar depreciates. On November 30^th, upon the Fed’s announcement at 8am, the Euro gained two cents vs. the US dollar. As no capital is transferred, no further savings are required to sustain the Eurozone and the misallocation of resources continues, because no loans are sold. This is bullish of sovereign risk.

As we wrote before and can be seen from step 2, the Fed is now a creditor of the Eurozone. As sovereign risk deteriorates in the Eurozone, the Fed will be forced to first keep reducing the cost of these swaps and later indefinitely roll them, to avoid an increase in interest rates in the US dollar funding market. Long term, this can only be bullish of gold. In the short term, the volatility in risk assets will continue to be horribly painful.

Martin Sibileau

Please, click here to read this article in pdf format: september-5-2011

In our last letter, we showed that our view from May 2010 is fully developing (We had stated that eventually money supply in the Eurozone would be determined by the growth in the zone’s fiscal deficits). Also, the contagion from the Eurozone to the USD zone is also growing, thanks to the EUR/USD currency swaps extended by the Fed to the European Central Bank. This contagion, we wrote, is nothing new, but had been highly criticized already in the early 1930’s by Jacques Rueff. We insist therefore that readers get a copy of Mr. Rueff ‘s “The Monetary Sin of the West”, published in 1972. An online version can be found at: www.mises.org/books/monetarysin.pdf . Too old? Perhaps, but remember: There is nothing more practical than a good theory!

If you have been following us vs. other analysis, you will notice that only recently, other analysts are beginning to pay attention to these FX swaps. Mainstream analysts refer to it as the “Fed’s USD backstop”, which is also appropriate. Why is this for us so relevant? Because thanks to this backstop, the world ends up being impacted similarly (“similarly” being the operative word here) to what we would see, if the Fed bailed out Eurozone banks. Is the Fed bailing out foreign banks providing this backstop? We see it that way, although the Fed will always deny it. But think of this simple question: What would happen to the weakest Eurozone banks that need to roll over USD funding, if that backstop wasn’t there? They would certainly be insolvent by now. However, the Fed doesn’t see it that way. What the Fed sees is the underlying counterparty risk. The Fed turns around the question to tell us that if the backstop was not there, the US banks would have funding problems, competing with Eurozone banks for funding.

To his credit, Dr. Ron Paul, was the only politician to see this far in advance, last year, when he questioned Mr. Daniel Tarullo, member of the Board of Governors of the Fed, on this point on May 20th, at a joint hearing of the Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade (watch minutes 6:22 and 7:36 of this video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMo-V8HoNdc ).

Had we been in that session with Mr. Tarullo, we would have asked him what would the Fed do, if the dollars lent to the European Central Bank, forwarded to Eurozone banks, cannot be paid back because the assets these dollars funded are in default or generating substantial losses to the originating banks?

This is important because that is exactly what occurs during stagflation: Businesses go bankrupt. We know the answer: The Fed would do nothing, allowing these dollars, printed money, to remain overseas. This is why we say that the FX swap is effectively quantitative easing from the Fed on the Eurozone. We will go on record stating this: AS LONG AS THESE FX SWAPS (USD BACKSTOP) REMAIN IN PLACE, WE WILL BE LONG GOLD. THE TOP FOR THE GOLD MARKET WILL BE REACHED THE DAY THIS BACKSTOP IS ELIMINATED EITHER VOLUNTARILY OR FORCED UPON THE FED BY THE MARKET AND NOT ONE MINUTE EARLIER.

Turning now to the Eurozone, it is completely clear now what we have been predicating time and time again, since February 8th, 2010: The zone faces an institutional crisis. Back then, it was only an institutional problem. The disastrous handling of the crisis by Euro politicians have made it now a real economic one and we think there is no way out here but dissolution in chaos. This again, shall be very bullish of gold and bearish of risk (unlike mainstream view, we distinguish gold from “risk” because to us, gold is money). Enough said. We could go on but we think that over the past letters we have been very clear and unfortunately, times will now accelerate and we will witness this problem evolve exponentially.

In China, it seems the People’s Bank has not been sterilizing its FX reserves purchases. However, to mitigate the corresponding inflationary impact, it has been relentlessly increasing the reserves requirement ratio of financial institutions, using the “credit multiplier” channel. According to Bank of America’s Rates and FX Research team (“Global Rates and FX Weekly”, August 26th, 2011), by September 2010 the level of USD reserves had reached $3.4 trillion (CNY21.8 trillion) , while the People’s Bank’s debt had decreased from CNY4.4 trillion to CNY2.7 trillion. The gap between the FX reserves (i.e. assets) and the debt (liabilities) was covered by the increase in reserve requirements (i.e. liabilities too: Remember that the banks’ reserves in a central bank are an asset to the banks and a liability to the central bank).

Why did China’s central bank choose to hike reserves rather than issue debt to mitigate the impact of its USD purchases? It was simply cheaper, apparently, which means that if the trend continues two things will become evident: 1) the profitability of China’s banking system will be hurt, and 2) the US Treasury will find it harder to place its debt.

On the first point, the central bank may be forced to increase the interest rate on the reserves, dragging banks to depend on it, increasing the cost of eventually appreciating the Yuan (i.e. exit strategy). On the second point, the Fed will be forced to step in, should China merely stop accumulating reserves. We may add that as the first point becomes more relevant, the cost of eventual defaults will be way higher. Both issues are very bullish of gold and bearish of risk, too.

After all these considerations, we are really surprised to hear mainstream analysts say that another recession (as if the last one had ended) would be a so-called Black Swan event (i.e. a rare event). How so? We would argue that the opposite is true: In this context, avoiding a double dip is actually the Black Swan event!

Martin Sibileau

Please, click here to read this article in pdf format: november-18-2010

A quick note to finish the week…We think we are entering a new stage in the dynamics of the Eurozone, and that the ongoing negotiation between Ireland and the European Union as well as the weakness in the Euro prove that the comment we made on September 9th was appropriate. We wrote:

“…Another interesting perspective is that which finds strength in the Euro, from the fact that peripheral countries can now access the European Financial Stability Facility, which is now effectively operational. We actually see it the other way: Precisely because the weak countries will access this facility, the break of the European Monetary Union will be accelerated, as the rich countries are faced with true costs; costs which until now were being piled under the big rug (the balance sheet) of the ECB…” (www.sibileau.com/martin/2010/09/09 )

Since November 4th, the Euro has embarked on a very defined downward trend. Counter intuitively, this should not occur.  Ireland does not need to access the market before June 2011 and if it required funding, the European Union is ready to sign the cheque. Therefore, what is behind the weakness?

To understand this issue and our previous comment, we need to see first that Europe has first and above all an institutional problem. Secondly, one can use the Game Theory approach. We are not well versed in this approach. We studied the theory while as undergraduate students and thanks to the extraordinary advancement of mathematics, we know it has evolved tremendously since John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern first published in 1944 the famous “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior”. We are very reluctant to use formal approaches to human action but we think the particular negotiations that are currently taking place can be easily analyzed under this method. Here are what we think can be premises:

1.-Ireland’s financial position, just like any other peripherals, deteriorates with the passage of time. However, as it does not require funding until June 2011, its position vs. time is stronger than that of Portugal or Spain (i.e. the first “derivative” of loss vs. time is lower for Ireland. But not the second. By 2011, everyone is on the same leveled field ).

2.-Ireland knows (1) above (i.e. has perfect information) and uses this upper hand to better negotiate the terms of the inevitable bailout. However, if it waits too long, the advantage is lost.

3.-Portugal, Spain and Italy know (i.e. have imperfect information) that once Ireland gets help via the EFSF, spaces will fill quickly. There isn’t simply enough room for everyone. The EFSF cannot be but for exceptions. Otherwise, there is no catch! An EFSF for everyone can simply not be AAA rated: A bank that lends with leverage cannot honor all deposits at once. Furthermore, keep in mind that there are no defined pan-European taxes supporting draws under the EFSF, but a promise from each respective EU member to get those funds somehow (Another important aspect here is that the IMF is contributing an additional 50% , which a friend and reader pointed to us is simply another important source of debt monetization).
Therefore, once Ireland draws under the EFSF, a race will start by Portugal, Spain and Italy to win the next seat, to be the next in line to draw, before the window closes. Be ready. All kinds of tricks and influences will be played at this point.

4.-Core EU members (i.e. Germany, France, Netherlands) know that the puck must stop somewhere, before their own solvency is compromised. If it is compromised, the only way out is a blanket, wide monetization of government debt by the European Central Bank, a massive currency crisis, assuming the EU monetary union doesn’t break. What are they doing about it? Ms. Merkel has been pushing to for the creation of a debt crisis mechanism, in which an “orderly” bankruptcy is carried out and whereby sovereign bondholders take a haircut. This is simply a wrong and absurd idea, which if implemented, it will only accelerate the demise of the monetary union. On this note, we think it is worth reading UBS Tommy Leung’s recent comments (UBS EU Credit Stategy – Daily Morning Walk, November 16th, 2010: “A glaring contradiction”) where he reflects upon this issue. Mr. Leung observes that this mechanism would discriminate between sovereign debt issued prior and after 2013, effectively creating a two-tiered EU sovereign debt market. This actually goes against the natural solution for Europe, which is a unified bond market! In this scenario, bonds issued prior to 2013 would be structurally senior to those issued from 2013 on. Mr. Leung further asks how would this be consistent under Basel III, where banks holding these bonds assign a zero risk-weight to them. Clearly, if a restructuring mechanism is considered, the possibility of default cannot be ignored.  Mr. Leung leaves the topic here, but we don’t. If default cannot be ignored, the arbitrage within the EU financial system will be immediate, with depositors shifting their savings from the banks holding the subordinated bonds to those holding the senior bonds. This can only deteriorate the balance sheet of the European Central Bank.

Where does all this leaves us? What can core EU members do? Nothing! Absolutely nothing. What will they do? Force more fiscal discipline on the other peripheral countries. But as we saw in point 3, once Ireland access the EFSF, these countries will have a strong incentive to fill in the last seat available. In other words, they will seek to show they can’t survive without it.

The US cannot react to this, as it is too concerned with its own problems. The latest performance of municipal debt is very telling in this respect. How can China react? By holding lower amounts of Euros as reserves and shifting that allocation to gold, slowly but steadily.

Lastly, we want to bring collective attention to the recent pressure the Fed is facing. Not only is there internal dissent regarding QE2, but also on Tuesday, as everyone must know by now, an open letter to the Fed was published by the Wall Street Journal, criticizing this latest move. Now, at our desk, we always have Bloomberg TV turned on and yesterday we noted how guest after guest was asked by different news anchors whether the Fed should not reconsider its dual mandate. Once an answer was given, the Bloomberg anchors replied asking whether Mr. Bernanke would likely resign on such change, noting that this is a possibility, given the new Republican majority in Congress. Are we thinking too much here? Were we watching a press op unfold or was this pure coincidence?

Martin Sibileau

Suppose you own a business and 1/3rd of your product is being bought by a single customer. What if this biggest customer tells you that as of June, he or she will stop buying? What do you do with your inventory? Exactly! You liquidate it in a fire sale! You had been selling what this biggest customer was buying, and then buying what you thought this customer would buy next. This has been precisely our thesis No. 1. As the chart below shows, after the Fed’s announcement at 2:15pm yesterday, Treasuries (long-end) sold off. (There was also profit taking in the Agency market):

The FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) expressed no change in the plans to buy $1.25 Tr of Agency mortgage-backed securities, $200 bn of Agency debt and $300 bn of Treasuries. There was also no change to the fed funds target range. At 1:22 pm, Mr.Volcker, Chairman of the newly formed Economic Recovery Advisory Board and Chairman of the Fed between 1979 and 1983, had said that the current administration was committed to supporting banks. I think that led the market (and me) to believe there was going to be an upsize in Fed’s Treasuries purchases and, as the chart shows, that pushed Treasuries up (for a short time). The FOMC said the economy continued to contracting, but at a slower pace (GDP -6.1% q/q annualized).

I can’t understand stocks. The S&P 500 shot up on the news, and although it ended lower, it was still +2.16% (873.64pts). Why is this hard for me to see? If the long-term (30-yr) risk-free yield rose above 4% post-FOMC and the USD fell against the Euro and the Canadian dollar (=outflow of capital), why are stocks higher? (The USD rose against the yen and Pound, but this reflects and does not explain the rise of stocks). Isn’t a risk-free 4% yield good enough? Maybe it isn’t so risk-free … To make things more interesting, Treasuries in the short-end (2- yrs) had a solid bid, steepening the curve at close. Before I continue, I must say, thesis no. 3 (proposed on Friday) was refuted yesterday (= I was wrong!). There was no announcement of an exit strategy and stocks went up. I could say that to stop buying (FOMC statement) somehow indicates the way out (exit) of this mess, but I think the Fed is only bluffing, and it will keep buying anyway…Perhaps, we may have to first look at the credit markets. The CDX IG12 index finished at 168 bps (-9bps) and the High Yield index also did well, about 2 pts up. Even the leveraged loan LCDX index rose more than 1 pt. What is this supposed to mean? Maybe the market is seeing a light at the end of the tunnel. Perhaps the Chrysler negotiations are positive, the distressed debt exchanges we are witnessing will really avoid defaults, perhaps the bank issuance coming outside of the FDIC-backed program (Goldman Sachs sold yesterday $2BN 6% 5-yr notes priced at T+410bps) is also a good sign. If this is the case, the market may wait for a confirmation this Friday, with the release of the ISM Manufacturing Index, before it moves anywhere (Readers’ feedback is welcome)…On this basis, I will wait until Friday, before I reject thesis No. 3. ONE LAST THOUGHT: If we are comfortable with a 4% long-term yield, with double-digit debt exchanges, with oil going higher on oversupply and stocks higher on awful news, maybe Keynes was right when he said that (refer April 28th letter): “…when output has increased and prices have risen, the effect of this on liquidity-preference will be to increase the quantity of money necessary to maintain a given rate of interest…” (General Theory, Chapter 13, published in 1936). We may indeed need more money to maintain the higher yields, to repay the double-digit maturities, a barrel of oil, Citibank shares or my morning coffee! I only hope that more money is also needed to pay your and my salary!