Please, click here to read this article in pdf format: march-1-2010

Over the weekend, we came across an article from U.S. Congressman and former Presidential Candidate Ron Paul, with whom we sympathize (refer: www.ronpaul.com ). The article was titled “Are U.S. taxpayers bailing out Greece?” and published on February 16th (refer: http://www.ronpaul.com/2010-02-16/ron-paul-are-us-taxpayers-bailing-out-greece/ ).
Briefly, Mr. Paul wrote: “…Is it possible that our Federal Reserve has had some hand in bailing out Greece? The fact is, we don’t know(…)Unless laws are changed to allow a complete and meaningful audit of the Federal Reserve, including its agreements with foreign central banks, we might never know if this is occurring or not…”
Mr. Paul left us thinking, and after careful consideration, we realized that the implication of this exercise may (or not) be in contradiction with what we wrote on Friday. Let us explain:

To begin with, we believe that indeed, there would be a cost to U.S. taxpayers, if Greece defaulted. We don’t think Greece will default, at least not in the near term, but there would be a cost nevertheless. The cost is not explicit and it would show its ugly face if a credit event was triggered under a sovereign (i.e. Greece’s) credit default swap.

Why?

Any US financial institution with a net long exposure to Greece’s sovereign credit default swaps would face an immediate funding problem. Therefore, the Fed would be pressed to rescue such institutions, while at the same time, it would have to provide currency swap lines to the European Central Bank, to avoid a collapse of the Eurodollar market.

The cost regarding the financial rescue would be on US taxpayers. This would be an unnecessary and most disappointing cost. After so much “quatsch” on regulation, how would the current US Administration justify having missed a flag as big as that of sovereign credit default swaps. There is currently a lot of quatsch about sovereign credit default swaps, but all superficial. The economic ignorance of politicians prevents them from understanding what these derivatives really imply. As we wrote earlier, under a system of fiat currency, allowing banks to sell insurance on sovereign debt is no different than allowing children to sell insurance on the financial risk of their parents. But politicians focus on the greedy side of those who trade these swaps, which is really idiotic, because these derivatives represent a huge boost to systemic risk, even if they were traded for the most morally justifiable reasons. If somebody bought credit insurance on the parents of the seller of that insurance, be it the most educated, hardworking or honest kid, he or she would still be dreadfully misled by the formal aspects of the contract, which lacks any solid content. The solution does not reside in prohibiting them, but in requiring that collateral on such trades, at least on non-Emerging markets credit default swaps, be posted in gold. (Note: Why do you think I believe that a commodity collateral would not be required on credit default swaps on emerging market countries?)

On the other hand, the cost needed to save the Eurodollar market would be global. The global feature of this cost is driven by the violent foreign exchange volatility the world would have to bear, where the notion of a global reserve currency would be clearly challenged. This brings us back to the point made last Friday, when we wrote that a sovereign credit event would be deflationary, and that liquidity preference, in particular a strong demand for USD, would challenge the value of gold.

We kept and keep thinking about this one. Given the hypothetical nature of this event, we can only speculate as to what conditions would be necessary for gold to rally. The first one that comes to mind is a catastrophic situation, where the Fed actually bails both the financial institutions and the Euro market but the market no longer trusts monetary authorities and every USD facilitated by currency swap lines is swiftly bought with Euros and immediately exchanged for gold.

If you think this twice, you will acknowledge it would not be the first time a flight to safety of this nature takes place. In fact, it would make sense. But again, this should occur under a total lack of monetary policy coordination and something else: The firm conviction that stimuli programs are useless. This would be a true capitulation. What is the probability for this scenario? Not too high for now, but not too low either, in our view.

Martin Sibileau

With yesterday’s fears of a rating’s downgrade on Greece’s sovereign debt and weak US jobs market data, the markets (except in Canada or Mexico) sold off. However, we could not make sense of the simultaneous rise in the price of gold.
 
We’ve seen this pattern before too, but it did not go too far, when it happened in 2008. Indeed, one could explain the behaviour by pointing at Mr. Bernanke’s comments yesterday, who made every effort before the Senate’s Banking Committee to be clear on the Fed’s intention to maintain a level of liquidity consistent with that of economic activity (weakness = low rate environment). Or maybe his comments on the possibility of reviewing MBS purchases, if required? But if that was the case, why would stocks not also rise, along with gold and oil? Why would the USD not weaken as well?
 
Clearly, the above factors cannot explain what happened yesterday. But if gold was bought as a way out of future currency debasements, then we have some comments to add here this morning.
 
If you have been reading “A View from the Trenches” long enough, you will remember that we turned neutral to bearish on gold (in USD) after the Dubai event, at the end of November 2009. Essentially, we believe the power of monetary policy coordination is a formidable challenge on gold’s prospects as a reserve currency. Therefore, if yesterday’s rally on gold and gold mining stocks was due to the increasingly likely fall of the Euro, as a consequence of the peripherals’ problems, we think gold bugs could later be disappointed.
 
Why?
 
In the 21st century, there are two global social classes: Politicians and taxpayers (This social stratification truly has global characteristics). If you think politicians will let you taxpayers get away from the inflation tax easily, think it twice. Let’s specifically consider the scenario where the Euro plunges. We think that if this happened, there would be an immediate increase in liquidity preference, expressed as a flight to the USD and the Treasuries markets. In that case, gold and stocks would be sold in favour of liquidity.
To those who disagree with this view, believing this chaotic situation would get off hands, we suggest that the Fed would be able to establish again, as it did in 2008, currency swap lines with other central banks, cushioning the impact of this move. This would be a deflationary event and no central bank would hesitate to provide extra liquidity. In summary, we fail to see a compelling story to be long of gold. And yet we are indeed worried, because the market proved us wrong yesterday and will prove us wrong today too, for gold is already at $1,112/oz.
 
For an historical perspective on this dynamic, let me quote below part of an interview M. Jacques Rueff gave to The Economist (Jacques Rueff: (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Rueff ). The interview was published on June 1965, and titled “The Role and the Rule of Gold.” The entire interview was reprinted in Jacques Rueff’s book “The Monetary Sin of the West”, MacMillan Co., New York, 1971, Part III. Its online version can be found at (www.mises.org/books/monetarysin.pdf ):
 
 
The Economist: …one of the countries that saw the biggest constriction imposed by the gold standard was, of course, Britain, which held no foreign exchange in its reserves. And, as we have always recognized, Britain at this time suffered precisely because of the harsh and inflexible disciplines of the gold standard, which you now want to restore.
 
J.R.: Let me tell you that you touch a point on which I have quite a few personal recollections. In 1930 I was financial attaché in the French Embassy in London, and in that capacity I was responsible for the deposits of the French Treasury with British banks. They were the direct result of eight years of the gold-exchange standard, because we had kept the pounds sterling in London, as my colleagues in New York had kept in the American market the dollars that had been pouring into the French Treasury from 1927 onward. Then, in 1931, the failure of the Austrian Creditanstalt caused successive waves of repatriations; and it was this collapse of the gold-exchange standard that, without any possible doubt, transformed the depression of 1929 into the Great Depression of 1931.
 
The Economist: While you are on this historical episode, what would your comments be on the very widespread view that it was to a substantial extent French pressure on London at that time, through the withdrawal of sterling balances, that was in part responsible for the general collapse later on?
 
 J.R. Let me tell you that, unhappily for the world, the French pressure did not exist, or was so mild that it had no effect. There is a very interesting document from this period, a letter from Sir Austen Chamberlain, who was then Foreign Secretary in London, to M. Poincaré, who was Prime Minister and Finance Minister in France; it must be of 1928. Sir Austen said, “We know that you are entitled to ask gold for your sterling, but in the frame of the close friendship between Britain and France we ask you, so as to avoid trouble for the City of London, not to do that.” And we were, I must say, weak enough to comply with this request and not ask for gold. The fact that I had such important sterling deposits in London shows that we did not use this right to ask for gold. The adjustment, which would hardly have been felt if carried out on a day-to-day basis, was not made, and we had the fantastic boom of 1927, 1928, and 1929. This explains the depth of the collapse and of the depression, because the adjustment was so long delayed. We were too gentle in complying with official appeals not to convert our sterling balances into gold…
 
 
The analogy here consists in that France did the same we suspect the US would do in case the Euro plunged: Providing Europe with USD currency swaps is the same as having France in the late 1920′s not withdrawing their gold deposits from London. Think about it. I know it sounds counter intuitive at first sight, but ask yourselves what was backing the sterling pound then, and what would the Euro be exchanged for if it plunged? If the USDs are there for the Euro as gold was for the pound, we will be only delaying a painful adjustment. But politicians only care about the present.
 
Martin Sibileau

Please, click here to read this article in pdf format: february-12-2010

(This is the last day of the week and “A View from the Trenches” will not be published again until February 25th, as we will be traveling.)

The statement released by European authorities yesterday was a mere expression of support for Greece, explicitly denying a request by Greece, for financial aid. The markets accordingly sold all things European, including and in particular Spanish financials. The picture does not look so good and yet, stocks outside the Euro zone (except for Athens, of course) rallied yesterday.

What do we make of this?
On one hand, we had another Treasuries auction yesterday. This time for $16BN 30-yrs, with the yield rising to 4.72%. The UST 2y10y curve ended 4bps steeper at 285bps. The Czech Republic was also deceived when it raised 15-yr debt on Wednesday and Greek banks seem to be facing funding problems. We also face significant uncertainty with the latest developments in Iran.  But on the other hand, the markets received some “optimistic” releases too. Continuing job claims in the US kept their downward trend, Australia also saw an improvement in its labour market and the CPI reading in China was stronger than expected.

Briefly, of one thing we may be certain: Capital is flowing out of the Eurozone and into the rest of the world. But at the same time, capital seemed yesterday to also be preferring commodities and basic materials, which puzzles us, because the macroeconomic backdrop is bearish for us.

In our view, we should not see yesterday’s rally in North American stocks and credit, as well as in crude and oil, as a bullish signal, after the EU meeting’s statement. Why? Because for this rally to be interpreted as bullish, the Euro should have rallied as well! It didn’t and in fact plunged from a tall cliff, specially against the Canadian dollar. A reduction in the purchasing power of the Eurozone should not be seen as something positive for global growth (= for oil demand and hence for the Canadian market!)

Interestingly enough, Freddie Mac yesterday announced that it will buy practically all 120+days delinquent mortgage loans from its fixed rate and adjustable rate mortgage Participation Certificate securities. We had foreseen a move of this type and discussed it in December and on our first letter of 2010 (www.sibileau.com/martin/2010/01/04 ). This is what we wrote then:

“…As credit spreads are already very low again, the increase in sovereign risk (yield) should make debt a less profitable investment, when compared against equity. In December, I associated this process with USD strength. Now, I am not so sure. Since my last letter of 2009, the US Treasury announced it would lift the cap on the Preferred Stock Purchase Program (refer Michael Cloherty’s “Removing the PSPP ceiling: Treasury’s unlimited support”, Bank of America’ “US Agencies” report of Dec 29/09). This explicit show of support for agency debt (which I assumed it was going to smoothly disappear in 2010) tells me that the USD strength will be only a relative notion in 2010. I say relative because the strength should show vs. those countries that explicitly decide to import USD inflation (i.e. Brazil) or face serious fiscal problems (i.e. Euro zone), while the weakness should show vs. those countries that will profit from the credit-inflated recovery (Emerging markets or commodity currencies, like the CAD)…”

Back to the impressive strength shown yesterday by the Canadian Dollar. At yesterday’s open, you needed 1.0621 CAD to buy 1 USD. At close, 1.05 were enough. The CAD was even stronger of course vs. the Euro, finishing at 1.4383 CAD/EUR, from 1.4591 at open. What granted such a move?  In our view, the strength in the CAD was not fully reflected in the stocks market (TSX 60), which closed +1.32% higher, at 11,435.49pts. We think instead this movement may have mostly reflected a shift in central banks’ reserves, out of the EUR and into the CAD. What makes us think so? The relatively flat performance of crude oil, which still doesn’t break through its bearish trend.

Martin Sibileau

Please, click here to read this article in pdf format: february-11-2010

The world is speculating on the outcome of the meeting of European leaders later today, in Brussels. In the meantime, yesterday Mr. Bernanke made clear his intention to raise the discount rate, sooner than later. Furthermore, yesterday also, the 10-yr $25BN US Treasuries auction was weak. It’s true, there were a lot of other problems markets were focused on, including the weather on the east coast, but then again, are Treasuries not supposed to act as a safe haven in times of chaos? We took note of this and of the fact that yields rose in parallel (shift upwards), with the 2y10y curve ending at 281.1bps, flat. We will be watching this market closer as well as its impact on swaps and Agencies, for we feel this may be signaling an upcoming tectonic shift. It’s pure intuition for now, we acknowledge, but sometimes intuition has merits too…

On another note, we continue to insist with the view that Europe is facing an institutional crisis, rather than the short-term liquidity crisis seen by so many mainstream analysts. What is the difference? Here is a defining point:

If the crisis was indeed about short-term liquidity (with long term solvency concerns), then it should not matter whether it is the IMF or the European Union that bails out stressed peripherals. If the problem was only short-term liquidity, form should be subordinated to facts. Yet facts are subordinated to form. It is precisely because nobody seems to be able to come up with a sustainable and acceptable “form”, that we see no facts! (Facts = Risk mitigating actions, like loan guarantees)

If the crisis was only about short-term liquidity also, the Euro should have not been impacted as it has. How measurable is the impact of the liquidity situation in California on the USD? How can therefore Greece have such an impact on the Euro? It is the very sustainability of the European Union that is at the core of this crisis.

Why is this relevant? Because it tells us something: Today, it is likely that no long-term credible path will be announced.

Lastly and related to this crisis too, we want to draw collective attention to an issue that in our view has not received enough consideration. Much has been made and written on financial regulation necessary to prevent financial crisis. We, at “A View from the Trenches” have also written many times that regulation is useless and counterproductive, for the root of the problem is the monetary system that the world is embracing. A central banking system is intrinsically weak, arbitrary and leveraged, and attacking the distributors of a currency (i.e. financial institutions) will not make the system any stronger. However, there are other issues regulators can positively address, which we think have not been addressed yet. One of those is the potentially destructive nature of sovereign credit default swap contracts, which are currently booming.

In our opinion, these swaps are true weapons of mass destruction. Essentially, if a sovereign defaults, the party that bought protection should be compensated for the loss on the corresponding reference securities. But who thinks any counterparty would have enough liquidity to honor these contracts, if say, we see a default in the US or the UK, for instance? What would be the value of billions of credit protection on US sovereign risk sold by Citi or Goldman, if the US defaulted on its debt? What would be the value of credit protection on German sovereign risk sold by Deutsche Bank, if Germany or France actually defaulted? Zero! Given the fiat monetary system we live in, no financial institution would be able to have enough liquidity to fund the increasing margins, even before such defaults are declared, because the value of the collateral denominated in USD or Euros would drop materially, as jump-to-default risk rises. Under such scenario, things would spiral out of control and it would be evident that either central banks end up bailing out both the financial system and the sovereign, triggering a massive hyperinflation in the process, or the biggest of all depressions would be upon us.

Restrictions on this market would be useless, because they would not acknowledge the intrinsically leveraged nature of the contracts. The solution, in our opinion, is that counterparty risk be collateralized with gold, instead of fiat currency, for those sovereigns with the strongest currencies (=the most leverage!).

Martin Sibileau